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Abstract
Numerous approaches to a quantum theory of gravity posit fundamental ontologies that exclude
spacetime, either partially or wholly. This situation raises deep questions about how such
theories could relate to the empirical realm, since arguably only entities localized in spacetime
can ever be observed. Are such entities even possible in a theory without fundamental spacetime?
How might they be derived, formally speaking? Moreover, since the fundamental entities can’t
be smaller than the derived by assumption (since relative size is a spatiotemporal notion) and
so can’t ‘compose’ them in any ordinary sense, would a formal derivation actually show the
physical reality of localized entities? We address these questions via a survey of a range of
theories of quantum gravity, and generally sketch how they may be answered positively.
Keywords: spacetime; quantum gravity; empirical incoherence; causal set theory; loop quantum
gravity; string theory; non-commutative geometry
1 Local beables and empirical coherence
A central concern of philosophy of science is understanding how the theoretical connects to the
empirical. This is not the place to propose another theory describing, or prescribing, this connection;
let alone to consider how such a theory might, in turn, relate to how science actually works. At a
high level of generality, however, presumably the link is established by observing (in some sense) a
material ‘something’, in some determinate state or other, at some spatial location at some moment
in time and connecting this occurrence to our theory, for instance by postulating, in our theory,
entities which behave in ways that would explain our observation. This is crude, no doubt, but seems
to capture quite generally the nexus between our theorizing about the world and our experiencing
it, from meter readings in the lab to observing distant galaxies with a radio telescope to the results
of high energy collisions.
The bottom line is that empirical science as we understand it presupposes the existence of
what John Bell (1987, 234) called ‘local beables’: basic substances “which are definitely associated
with particular space-time regions.” Local beables represent the material content of our universe,
ultimately constituting what we observe, though of course, most specific properties postulated of
these local beables depend on the specific theory at stake. At the fullest level of generality, however,
they share one crucial feature made clear by Bell in the quotation above and reasserted by Tim
Maudlin (2007, 3157): “local beables do not merely exist: they exist somewhere.”
Maudlin’s paper is a criticism of ‘configuration space’ interpretations of quantum mechanics,
but it ties together the two ideas just developed to challenge any theory (plus interpretation) which
claims that fundamentally, familiar space and time do not exist. ‘Normal’ theories, which postulate
space and time, allow for local beables in their fundamental ontology, so the observable local beables
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can potentially be understood as composed, spatiotemporally, of the fundamental ones. A theory
that does not postulate familiar space and time in its fundamental ontology precludes fundamental
local beables, and there is then no obvious strategy for identifying observable local beables—and
the question of the theory’s empirical significance becomes acute. Until this issue is addressed there
can be no question at all of such a theory being adequate. Indeed, Maudlin goes further, and argues
that the demands of empirical contact imply that acceptable theories must postulate fundamental
local beables, and hence fundamental space and time.
We will return to his ‘ultimate’ argument for this position at the end of the paper; for now, we
want to point out that the problem may be worse than not knowing how to test a theory without
spacetime. Following Jeff Barrett (1999, §4.5.2),1 we define a theory to be empirical incoherent in
case the truth of the theory undermines our empirical justification for believing it to be true. Thus,
goes the worry, if a theory rejects the fundamental existence of spacetime it is threatened with
empirical incoherence because it entails that there are, fundamentally, no local beables situated in
spacetime; but since any observations are of local beables, doesn’t it then follow that none of our
supposed observations are anything of the kind? The only escape would be if spacetime were in
some way derived or (to use the term in a very general sense, as physicists do) ‘emergent’ from the
theory. But the problem is that without fundamental spacetime, it is very hard to see how familiar
space and time and the attendant notion of locality could emerge in some way . . . at least without
some concrete proposals on the table.
Suppose then that as far as many quantum theories of gravity are concerned, in various ways,
familiar spacetime is not admitted at the fundamental level, putting quantum gravity in violation
of Maudlin’s dictum, and threatening empirical incoherence. In the next section, we will consider
a range of such theories, and observe that the seriousness of these challenges depends a great deal
on what they postulate instead of spacetime. Different theories leave more or less of the standard
structure of spacetime intact, and so understanding our observations may, in the best case, require
only a relatively small shift in our conception of local beables. But we will also see that in theories
in which little or nothing of spacetime is left in the fundamental ontology, it still may be the case
that the question of deriving some formal structure that mirrors local beables can be answered
rather more readily than one might expect. In the final section we will turn to such derivations and
address Maudlin’s argument that such formal derivations never show that local beables are part of
an emergent ontology.
2 Theories without spacetime
Quantum gravity’s denial of the ‘spacetimehood’ of the fundamental structure thus comes in de-
grees. Some theories of quantum gravity characterize this structure only as somewhat different
from relativistic spacetimes, with at least apparently straightforward connections between the two
conceptualizations, while others conceive of it in radically novel ways, bearing hardly any resem-
blance to relativistic spacetimes. We thus find a spectrum of theories with increasingly iconoclastic
re-conceptions of ‘spacetime’. It is important to pose the challenge of empirical incoherence to
them separately, for as we shall show, they face greater or lesser challenges, of different kinds, in
finding spacetime, and hence with empirical coherence.
However, before proceeding, we note that there really is no single ‘spectrum’ of cases, linearly or-
dered by some single factor encapsulating the ‘spacetiminess’ of the structures in question. Instead,
one should envision the situation as more akin to an at best partially ordered field of theories in a
space with multiple dimensions corresponding to ways in which these structures depart from rela-
1Cf. also Barrett (1996, 50).
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tivistic spacetimes. In particular, the way one might rank theories conceptually, according to how
much of the concept of spacetime they maintain, does not always align with the ranking according
to the ease with which putative local beables or their surrogates can be found. Mainly for reasons
of presentation, our list will more closely follow the former scale; but bear in mind that the pic-
ture we are presently drawing is only a qualitatively valid representation of the situation as we see it.
(i) As a first step away from familiar relativistic spacetimes, we find discrete lattices. Many expect
the smooth classical spacetime to be coarsened into a discrete structure at the quantum level.
For instance, Lee Smolin (2009, 549) takes discreteness to be “well established” and a “generic
consequence” of a “large class” of quantum theories of gravity. Four statements characterize the
class of theories Smolin is interested in. First, the usual basic postulates of quantum mechanics are
assumed, although Smolin does not elaborate whether this includes, e.g., a form of a collapse or
projection postulate. Second, at least partial background independence is presupposed in the sense
that theory makes no reference to a fixed spacetime background, even though some features of the
fundamental structure such as its dimension and topology may be fixed. Third, the fundamental
structure is stipulated to be a set of basal elements partially ordered by causality. Finally, what
Smolin confusingly labels “discreteness” is assumed, viz. that the Hilbert space of the quantum
theory is separable, i.e., has a countable basis of combinatorial structures. The dynamics of the
theory arises from ‘moves’ which are local in the topology of the fundamental structure. Examples
of theories which fall within the purview of these assumptions, according to Smolin, are causal
set theory, dynamical triangulations, consistent discretization models and quantum causal history
models. (We take some of these theories, notably causal set theory, to be of type (ii), to be discussed
shortly.)
It may be complained that Smolin regards as a substantive consequence something that theories
satisfying these assumptions must already conform to. As the fourth postulate requires a form of
discreteness to hold of the theories at stake, it should come as no surprise that these theories are
“generically” discrete! There is something to this complaint, although it should be made clear that
the discreteness assumed and the discreteness derived are physically inequivalent statements: while
the fourth postulate requires that the basis of the Hilbert space is a countable set of combinatorial
basal elements, the consequence, which can be rigorously established, is that theories satisfying
the assumptions are ultraviolet finite. No doubt this consequence is of great physical significance.
What matters for our purposes is not the ultraviolet finiteness in itself, but yet another form of
‘discreteness’, viz. the discreteness of the geometry of the fundamental structure, for instance in
the form of an indivisible shortest length, which of course delivers the cut-off necessary to render
the theory ultraviolet finite. The relevant form of discreteness may be postulated ab initio, as it
is in causal set theory, or be the consequence of the axioms of the theory which do not directly
postulate discreteness, such as arguably is the case in loop quantum gravity. But whichever notion
we take to be most descriptive of ‘discreteness’, whether discreteness (or some other feature of the
fundamental structure such as non-commutativity) is postulated or inferred is immaterial for our
present purposes. What matters, ultimately, is the nature of the fundamental structure and how
it differs from general-relativistic spacetime.
One step removed from relativistic spacetimes, then, we find discrete lattices consisting of a set
of basal events exemplifying a structure spanned by the spatiotemporal relations obtaining among
pairs of such events. At this first step, it is important that the relevant relations be interpreted
spatiotemporally, in such a way that the only relevant difference is that what was a continuum before
now is a lattice. To facilitate the discussion, let us take the image of a lattice somewhat seriously
and imagine, without much loss of relevant generality, that all spatiotemporal relations among the
lattice points supervene on a basis of elementary spatiotemporal relations capturing spatiotemporal
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adjacency. We can thus think of these elementary relations as ‘spacing’ the basal events—the nodes
of the lattice—equidistantly in spatiotemporal terms. The structure thus possesses a minimum
spatiotemporal distance. The discreteness of the structure is captured by the demand that any two
basal events can be connected by elementary relations with only finitely many intermediate events.
The situation is thus analogous to the transition from continuous matter to atomism. One
can (almost) imagine a seventeenth-century Maudlin, arguing that since all our observations are
of continuous bodies, our fundamental theories must postulate their existence (some Cartesian
arguments have this flavour). But it’s not too hard to think of ways in which atomic matter
might appear continuous. Perhaps the interstices might not be observable to the naked eye—
because we lack the power to resolve the small variations involved. Similarly, the twenty-first-
century Maudlin’s challenge doesn’t get much bite (nor is it obviously intended to) on theories of
discrete spatiotemporal lattices. Without downplaying the challenges arising from understanding
this emergence of a continuum from a lattice structure, it seems clear that the discreteness of
the structure we took to be (smooth) spacetime alone does not suffice to render the localization
required for empirical coherence problematic. The local beables would presumably simply sit at
the nodes of the lattice, either each at a single node or distributed over a set of nodes which was
simply connected in terms of the adjacency relations in the supervenience basis.
If the spatiotemporal discreteness thus were the only prediction made by most, or at least many,
quantum theories of gravity, the challenge to their empirical coherence may easily be defeated. We
insist, however, that even this comparatively mild divergence from relativistic spacetime would
raise important questions regarding the emergence of the continuum from the lattice and regarding
classical limits of the theory. The trouble is that quantum gravity may necessitate more radical
departures.
(ii) Moving only slightly further away from relativistic spacetimes we find approaches to quantum
gravity that also describe the fundamental structure as discrete, but where the relations connecting
the basal events are not the ordinary spatiotemporal ones. For instance, causal set theory assumes
two basic kinematic axioms, viz. that an elementary relation of causality imposes a partial ordering
on the basal events, and that the structure is discrete in the sense explicated above. The approach
derives its motivation from results in general relativity, such as a theorem due to David Malament
(1977), which establish that the causal structure of spacetime is enough to recover almost everything
else that matters, most importantly the metric relations obtaining among the spacetime points,
at least up to a conformal factor. These results do not mean that relativistic spacetimes can
be recovered from structures satisfying the kinematic axioms alone. The hope of proponents of
this program is that additional dynamical constraints will lead to a principled story of how these
fundamental causal structures give rise to the much richer structures of relativistic spacetimes. The
elementary causal relation departs from ordinary spatiotemporal relations in three respects. Thus,
the first significant difference between the structures described by causal set theory and relativistic
spacetimes is that the fundamental relation in causal set theory does not wear a metric on its
sleeve. There simply is nothing on the fundamental level corresponding to lengths and durations
(or, more generally, to spacetime intervals), and no alternative interpretation of the causal sets
in terms of metrical relations is available. The second deep difference is that the theory lacks
the structure to identify ‘space’, in the sense of a spacelike hypersurface. One can of course find
sets of basal elements such that no pair exemplifies the causal relation, but such ‘antichains’ have
no structure beyond their cardinality. In other words, nothing but a difference analogous to that
between spacelike and timelike remains at the fundamental level. Finally, there is a sense in which
the discreteness of the causal set and the Lorentz invariance demanded of the emerging spacetime
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conspire to render the physics non-local in a way unfamiliar to general relativity.2 Hence, it is
much more adequate to conceive of the fundamental relation as sui generis causal, and not, strictly
speaking, spatiotemporal. Spacetime, together with spatiotemporal relations, emerges from the
fundamental structure.
The work that needs to be done to recover the spacetime structure from the causal set in
some continuum limit thus transcends that which was necessary in the simple lattice case. The
additional work arises because the fundamental structure cannot directly be interpreted spatiotem-
porally. Even though in general relativity it may be a small step from the causal structure to the
spatiotemporal, the discreteness of causal sets interferes with such a direct line of reasoning. As
it turns out, almost all causal sets satisfying the above kinematic axioms fail to have well-behaved
continuum limits resembling relativistic spacetimes. Thus, the underlying discrete causal structure
is at least sufficiently different from spacetime that this task becomes significant. However, it does
not immediately follow that we have finally reached a case in which empirical incoherence becomes
a significant worry. Even if it is hard to find the spatiotemporally local beables necessary for em-
pirical science, another strategy suggests itself: take localization in causal terms, and argue that
it is causal nexus, rather than spatiotemporally understood locality, which supplies the condition
relevant for empirical coherence. We won’t pursue this proposal, but we do want to say that we
have reached a transitional case of a theory in which the weakening of familiar spacetime structures
makes the derivation of local beables at least a challenging question.3
(iii) Somewhere even further removed from relativistic spacetimes we find the structures described
by loop quantum gravity (LQG), one of the main contenders for a quantum theory of gravity.
LQG starts out from a Hamiltonian formulation of general relativity, which is then subjected to
a canonical quantization procedure. This procedure has not been completely executed, and in
that sense what follows here remains tentative. There are two important ways in which the loop
structures of LQG differ from a discrete lattice to further diverge from relativistic spacetimes, both
having to do with the quantum nature of the fundamental structure. In order to appreciate them,
let us say a few words characterizing this structure.
What is believed to correspond to three-dimensional spatial structures are so-called ‘spin net-
works’. Spin networks can be thought of as networks of interwoven loops with ‘spin’ representations
sitting on both the network’s nodes and its edges. These spin representations quantify the discretely
valued quantum ‘volume’ to which the node corresponds and the discretely valued quantum ‘area’
of the edge corresponding to the surface of adjacency of the connected ‘volumes’, respectively.4
Although the dynamics of the theory is far from settled, the general scheme evolves these spin
network states by having an appropriate Hamiltonian operator acting on them. In general terms,
the action of the Hamiltonian on a node of the spin network will either be identity, i.e. the node
simply persists through ‘time’, or it splits the node into several nodes, or it fuses the node and
some other nodes into a single node. The resulting structure is taken to be the quantum analogue
of a four-dimensional spacetime and is called ‘spin foam’. As the dynamics of theory remains ill-
understood and the Hilbert space of spin networks enjoys greater technical control, we will proceed,
without loss to the pertinent philosophical points, with our analysis by focussing on spin networks.
The spin networks bear a superficial resemblance to the discrete lattices introduced above,
2Cf. Sorkin (2009).
3For a more detailed philosophical analysis of causal set theory and its challenges, cf. Wu¨thrich (forthcominga).
4These spin representations are the eigenvalues of quantum operators for which the relevant spin network states
are eigenstates. These operators afford a natural geometric interpretation, as indicated in the main text, but they
are not Dirac observables, i.e., they are not gauge-invariant. It thus remains an open question to which extent the
offered physical interpretation of these states will be vindicated in the final form of the theory.
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Figure 1: A spin network (shown as shaded) with two regions (shown enlarged) connected by an
adjacency relation and how they are embedded in an emerging spacetime.
but the relevant differences are twofold. First, the actually existing and physically fundamental
structure is supposed to be a quantum superposition of something like these spin networks, and
not just a single spin network. Since all the different structures in the superposition will have
a different connectivity (and perhaps different cardinality), and in this mathematical sense be
different structures altogether, what is local in one term of the superposition will in general not be
local in others. Except perhaps for very special states, local beables can thus not be part of the
fundamental, ontologically ultimate reality, but must instead emerge in some limit—presumably
the same as that in which locality emerges. How such local structures like relativistic spacetimes
emerge from spin networks is little understood at present.
Secondly, not only does the quantum superposition frustrate the applicability of locality criteria,
but there is a sense in which even a spin network corresponding to a single term in the superposition
is not amenable to the kind of localization that seems required to ensure empirical coherence. In
LQG, locality must be explicated in terms of the adjacency relations encoded in the fundamental
structure, but in general, it will not be the case that two fundamentally adjacent nodes map to the
same neighbourhood of the emerging spacetime, as illustrated in Figure 1. Hence the empirically
relevant kind of locality cannot be had directly from the fundamental level.
Let us explain in slightly more detail. Locality, or vicinity, in the emerging spacetime is deter-
mined by the spatiotemporal—indeed metric—relations obtaining between the events of spacetime.
Adjacency, the corresponding fundamental relation, is captured by the combinatorial connectivity
of the spin network structure. Suppose we have isolated the way in which a relativistic spacetime
emerges from the spin network, and thus how the basal events of the spin network get mapped
into the spacetime. In general—and that’s the crux—pairs of adjacent basal events need not be
mapped into Planck-sized neighborhoods of one another in the emerging spacetime: as judged in
the metric of the spacetime, these events are thus not ‘nearby’. Now, these ‘non-localities’ are
suppressed in the approximation of the large scales relevant to the emergence of spacetime. A par-
6
ticular spacetime would simply not emerge from the fundamental structure unless the adjacencies
it ignores are ‘weak’, i.e., washed out by those adjacencies it respects. If the adjacencies are of
sufficient strength and number between groups of events, then only a spacetime which places them
near one another could emerge from the corresponding spin network, at the expense of yet other,
weaker, adjacencies.5
As a consequence of these two distinct ways in which locality is threatened in LQG, the emer-
gence of relativistic spacetimes will presumably involve two distinct kinds of technical procedures.
The first procedure, an approximation in the sense of Butterfield and Isham (1999, 2001), should
show how the dynamics forces the quantum state into semi-classical states with a well-behaved
classical pendant such that, e.g., the quantum superposition is dominated by a single spin network.
The second, limiting, procedure then establishes the connection from the semi-classical states to
classical relativistic spacetime. A thorough analysis of these procedures in the context of LQG will
have to await another day, but it should be clear that significant work is required to regain the orig-
inal and arguably pertinent sense of locality.6 The entire programme of LQG stands and falls with
the success of this endeavour: if we fail to recover relativistic spacetimes from the spin foams and
spin networks of LQG, and hence fail to understand the relationship between general relativity and
LQG, there is no prospect of explaining why general relativity was as empirically successful as in
fact it was while at the same time false, and therefore in need of replacement. Every theory hoping
to dislocate a fundamental theory which is ‘incumbent at the time must discharge this explanatory
debt. We see no other way for LQG of doing so unless it is understood how spacetimes emerge
from spin networks. Once this is understood, however, the threat to LQG’s empirical coherence is
ipso facto averted.
(iv) The next two examples that we will discuss are drawn, not from attempts to quantize general
relativity, but from attempts to incorporate gravity within QFT, and in particular from the string
theory program. It might seem that string theory is not a very interesting case for discussion here,
because on a naive reading it looks exactly as if strings are local beables, bits of stuff describing
worldsheets in a classical spacetime. However, the discovery or intuition of various ‘dualities’
complicates this verdict considerably.
In general, to say that two theories are ‘dual’ is to assert that they are equivalent in some way:
under some mapping, some content is preserved. That general characterization leaves a lot open
of course: what constitutes a theory? What should be preserved? What kinds of mappings are
allowed? Rather than trying to answer those general questions, we will explain the idea with an
example: quantum harmonic oscillators are dual under the mapping 〈q, p;m, k〉 → 〈p,−q; 1/k, 1/m〉
(where m is the mass and k the spring constant). The duality exists because there are contributions
to the energy from both position (q) and momentum (p), so the Hamiltonian is preserved along
with the canonical commutation relations, so that the expectation values of dual observables, and
energy eigenvalues are preserved. Of course, as theories of particular quantum oscillators, these are
not equivalent theories at all, for there is a difference between mass m and mass 1/k, and there is a
difference between the state being ψ(q) and its being ψ(p) (in which case the spatial wavefunction
is the Fourier transform, ψ˜(q)). That is, one finds physical differences when one steps back from the
theory and looks ‘from the outside’, to give significance to mass, position etc. Things are different
in string theory because it is a ‘total theory’, from which there is no broader context in which to
distinguish duals in this way.
Two so-called ‘T-dual’ string theories live in compactified spaces—one or more spatial dimension
5For more on the difference and relation between relativistic spacetimes and the fundamental structures posited
by LQG, cf. Wu¨thrich (forthcomingb).
6For a bit more on how spacetimes may emerge from LQG, cf., again, Wu¨thrich (forthcomingb).
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has the topology of the circle—in which the radius of a compact dimension in one is the reciprocal
of the radius in the other. There are contributions to the Hamiltonian from the kinetic energy of
the string, which decreases with wavelength; and from energy due to tension in the string, which
increases with its length, so with the number of times the string winds around the dimension. Call
it the ‘winding number’. Thus for fixed wave- and winding-number around a circular dimension,
as its radius grows the kinetic energy decreases while the winding energy increases. Hence, for
suitably related radii, the Hamiltonian is preserved under the interchange of position around the
dimension, q, and winding degrees of freedom, w: 〈q, w;R〉 → 〈w, q; 1/R〉. In the quantum theory
winding is treated just like position, so: w is a continuous coordinate just like q;7 it has a canonical
momentum, pw; and the winding state is represented by a wavefunction ψ(w). Thus as long as
the mapping is understood also to exchange ordinary and winding momenta, it preserves canonical
commutation relations as well as the Hamiltonian, and we have dual theories just as before.
The formal story may be much the same in the two cases, but now that we have a total theory,
the interpretive consequences are quite different. There are no physical quantities, processes or
entities beyond those of the theory itself that might determine whether the radius of the compact
dimension is R or 1/R, and all we can do is ask what the theory says: but we know that whatever
value one theory assigns to a quantity, the dual theory assigns the same value to the dual quantity.
That is, on the assumption that the observables of the theory exhaust its physical content, there
is no physical difference which could settle the issue—the radii must be surplus representational
structure. In particular, the result of any possible observation, using any technology whatsoever
permitted in theory, has equally valid but distinct interpretations in the two theories. Therefore,
there is no determinate physical fact of the matter about the radius of the space in which the string
lives: the theory in which the radius is R describes exactly the same physics as the theory in which
the radius is 1/R.8
But of course a compact dimension in phenomenal space does have a determinate physical
radius: if one of the three observed dimensions turns out to be compact it has a very large, not
very small radius;9 if space turns out to be Kaluza-Klein, then the extra dimensions are very small,
not very large. Therefore, the space that a string lives in is not phenomenal space: the former has
no radius, the later does. (Unless one puts one’s foot down and proclaims a real but otiose fact of
the matter about which theory is correct, but that is to introduce ‘hidden variables’ into the theory,
for no clear reason.) String theorists generally conclude that there is some underlying ‘M-theory’
in which these differences are clearly merely unphysical choices of representation, and from which
phenomenal space emerges.
Other dualities, demonstrated or postulated, put similar pressure on deeper elements of space-
time structure. Mirror symmetry (Rickles forthcoming) relates spaces of different topologies, not
just metrics, and the AdS/CFT correspondence (Rickles, Teh, this volume) relates spaces with
different dimensions. The lesson seems the same: none of these can be taken as factual in the
fundamental picture of the world in string theory. But without them, the challenge of explicating
7 Thus according to Witten (1996, 29), the w-coordinate describes “another ‘direction’ peculiar to string theory”.
8To give a concrete illustration, Brandenberger and Vafa (1989) consider timing a photon around a closed dimension
of phenomenal space to determine its circumference. Suppose the result is 2piR. One model of the situation has a
string living in a space with a compact dimension of radius R, and with spatial wavefunction ψ(q). In the dual model
the compact dimension has dual radius 1/R, but the photon has the dual state ψ(w); this state evolves dually along
the winding coordinate, in effect describing a photon ‘moving along’ that ‘direction’ (see footnote 7). It turns out
(unsurprisingly) that in this dual model the winding coordinate has radius R, so the photon takes the same time to
‘travel around’ the winding coordinate as the original photon did to travel around space. In this dual theory then,
our phenomenal space does not correspond to the space of the string, but to the corresponding winding dimension.
9T-duality proofs generally assume a Minkowski geometry, and there seem to be differing opinions about whether
the duality would also hold in the more complex geometry of the familiar dimensions.
8
the familiar notion of local beable is formidable at least (if the spaces have different dimensions,
presumably there is not even a continuous map from open regions to open regions). Whether
it can be overcome we will not discuss further: for in these cases there is no special problem of
identifying observed local beables, even if there turn out to be none fundamentally. The reason is
that in each of these cases one of the duals has the spacetime structure of phenomenal spacetime:
e.g., in one of the T-dual theories the radius equals the phenomenal radius. The local beables
in that representation (paradigmatically, scattering events) then behave like the local beables we
observe—even if the dualities mean that they are not local beables in the dual representation, and
so are not fundamentally local beables at all. In other words, though dualities have the potential
to eliminate local beables from the basic furniture of the world, they do not seem to introduce any
special problem for connecting string theory to experiment, let alone entail empirical incoherence.
(v) It turns out that certain string theories have a ‘non-commutative field theory’ (NCFT) in their
limits. These are field theories living in a spacetime in which the coordinates do not commute:
literally, x · y 6= y · x. What does this mean? Well, the connection between algebra and geometry
has of course been known a long time. Beyond the kind of relation described by Descartes, the
differential geometry of a manifold can be uniquely characterized by the algebra of scalar and con-
stant fields on it. For instance, consider the algebra of fields polynomial in commuting coordinates:
[x, y] = 0. Such an algebra is unique to the differential structure of the plane. Further, Bob Geroch
(1972) pointed out that all the geometric objects involved in general relativity can be re-described
as objects acting on such an algebra (for instance a derivative is clearly a special automorphism of
the algebra). John Earman (1989, §9.9) proposed using such ‘Einstein algebras’ to short-cut the
hole argument: arguably, diffeomorphisms do not change the algebra (but see Rynasiewicz 1992).
Once you know that ordinary geometry can be equivalently (formally speaking) formulated in
terms of a commutative algebra, it’s natural to consider generalizing by choosing [x, y] = θx,y 6= 0,
some deformation from commutativity. Can all the necessary geometric objects still be defined?
Yes, as can those necessary for treating a fiber bundle over the manifold—all the mathematical
apparatus of modern Lagrangian physics exists in the non-commutative algebra generalizing geom-
etry.10 Non-commutative versions of familiar field theories can be readily written down, so it seems
it is a contingent matter whether such a theory is correct.
Such a theory simply does not contain a manifold in its formulation. The fundamental objects
are the elements of the algebra, scalar ‘fields’, identified only by their algebraic relations to the other
‘fields’, and not by their ‘point-values’. Indeed, that concept has no place in the algebra. In the
commutative case it turns out that the elements of the algebra can be represented by scalar fields;
since that representation has a manifold one can ask for the value at a point, but it’s important
to realize that only whole fields, defined over the whole manifold map to anything in the algebraic
formulation. Still, in the commutative case, it’s natural to take the representation as a literal
description of reality and the algebra as a mere abstraction. But what about the non-commutative
case? The usual manifold representation doesn’t exist (its coordinates commute!) so if the physics
of the world were described by a NCFT, could it possibly be related to spacetime or local beables?
Or do we finally have a clear case of empirical incoherence?
No, we do not, because there is a technical strategy for solving the problem. The non-
commutative algebra also has a representation in an ordinary space, if one introduces a new product
for scalar fields over the manifold, the ‘Moyal star’, ?, according to which coordinate-fields don’t
commute: x ? y − y ? x ≡ [x, y]? = θx,y (where this relation holds point-wise). Then an algebraic
field theory maps into a field theory on the manifold, but with ordinary multiplication replaced
10See Douglas and Nekrasov (2001), Szabo (2003).
9
by ?-multiplication. The usual techniques of QFT are applied and phenomenal local beables, typ-
ically in the form of scattering events, predicted—indeed, such a calculation is exactly what one
finds in physics papers on the topic. (Given all this, why not again take the representation to be
literal? To do so would commit one to the reality of physically otiose structure, since the actual
commutativity of coordinates plays no physical role; it cannot be probed by any physical process,
since these only respect ?-multiplication. So insisting on the fundamental reality of the manifold
is much like insisting on the reality of an absolute standard of simultaneity in special relativity.)
This is not to say that there are no problems in understanding the empirical content of NCFT (for
instance, renormalizability depends on how the details are filled in), but it is to say that there is a
technical strategy for cashing it out.
In short, NCFT probably represents the biggest conceptual break with the conventional idea of
spacetime and hence of local beables, but it turns out that there is a rather direct way of mapping
the purely algebraic structure into entities that look like local beables.
(vi) For greater completeness we want to acknowledge, more-or-less in passing, a growing number
of other iconoclastic approaches to quantum gravity that threaten the fundamentality of spacetime
in another way. The complexity of the situation, however, means that we will not attempt to say
how they bear on the issue of empirical significance.11
Following the lead of Andrei Sakharov (1967), these approaches take gravity to be an intrinsi-
cally classical, large-scale phenomenon arising from the collective action of the dynamics of more
fundamental, non-gravitational degrees of freedom.12 Gravity would thus be a residual force, not an
elementary aspect of nature. This motley crew of approaches takes gravity to be an ultimately ther-
modynamical, hydrodynamical, solid-state-physical, or computational phenomenon which emerges
at the large scales or low energies that are usually accessible to us. Thus, gravity only emerges from
an even more radically different physical structure or from non-gravitational physical processes or
forces. For instance, it could be the case that the general-relativistic Einstein-Hilbert action can
be found to some order of an effective Lagrangian of some fundamental quantum fields propagat-
ing on a fixed, but flat, background spacetime. Whether, and if so to what extent, however, the
non-fundamentality of gravity entails the non-fundamentality of spacetime differs for each of these
approaches and would have to be addressed in a separate enquiry. What ought to be emphasized
presently, however, is that the entailment is certainly not automatic, as approaches in this family
sometimes reject the general-relativistic understanding of gravity as resolved into the geometry of
spacetime. Thus, they may assume a flat and fixed Minkowskian background spacetime on which
the non-gravitational fundamental interactions among elementary physical entities occurs and give
rise to gravity at some appropriately larger scales. Hence, depending on the particular approach
spacetime may or may not be emergent in these approaches.
Before returning to the issue of empirical coherence, let us stress an important difference in the
route back to local beables taken by approaches of types (i)-(iii), vis-a`-vis those of types (iv)-(v).
In the first three cases, where we had either a discrete structure in the form of a spatiotemporal
lattice or of a fundamental causal set or else the discrete and non-local spin networks of LQG,
the main aim in regaining local beables is to show how spacetime, and in particular relativistic
spacetimes, re-emerge from the fundamental structure in an appropriate limit of large scales or low
energies. The presumption here is that if we can recover the usual continuous spacetime, hopefully
with some energy-matter content, then we have reduced the problem of identifying local beables to
11Bain and Crowther (this volume) address approaches in this category.
12For a recent survey, cf. Barcelo´ et al. (2011); Wu¨thrich (2005, §3.1) gives an accessible and short statement of
the main ideas of Sakharov’s groundbreaking essay.
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the classical problem of identifying observables (even if this latter is non-trivial). For approaches
in the other group, string theory and NCFT, the path to local beables does not lead primarily
through a recovery of a relativistic spacetime, but instead through the identification of magnitudes
connected with scattering events—and the usual phenomenology of particle physics.
3 Empirical coherence revisited
We apologize if the reader has mental whiplash after that roller-coaster tour of several decades of
intensive research in fundamental physics, and some of the deep conceptual questions that go with
it. Clearly our account does not do justice to the many relevant issues raised—that would require
at least a book.13 But let’s refocus on the point of this excursion for the present work.
We have given sufficient detail to make a few points clear. First, there are grades of non-
spatiality, or non-spatiotemporality: mere discreteness is not a great conceptual leap from ordinary
spacetime, an algebraic ontology is, and there are cases in-between. Second, and perhaps counter-
intuitively, the technical difficulty of obtaining a spacetime structure—and hence the possibility of
local beables—does not increase monotonically with as theories become more conceptually removed
from spacetime. For instance, causal sets may preserve an important aspect of spacetime, but it
doesn’t permit the ready identification of local beables, while if we take dualities seriously, important
aspects of spacetime are missing in string theory, and yet local beables are available. So finally,
we have seen fairly convincingly that there is no general argument that the omission of spacetime
from the fundamental ontology will automatically produce technical problems in the derivation of
local beables that will lead to empirical incoherence.
Still, we think that legitimate conceptual questions about the significance of the derivation
remain. Indeed, Maudlin’s ultimate argument against theories without spacetime raises them par-
ticularly sharply. Our final goal is to address them—and in so doing demonstrate the philosophical
significance of the question of how spacetime might ‘emerge’ from a theory without spacetime.
First, Maudlin:
But one might also try instead to derive a physical structure with the form of local
beables from a basic ontology that does not postulate them. This would allow the
theory to make contact with evidence still at the level of local beables, but would
also insist that, at a fundamental level, the local structure is not itself primitive. ...
This approach turns critically on what such a derivation of something isomorphic to
local structure would look like, where the derived structure deserves to be regarded as
physically salient (rather than merely mathematically definable). Until we know how
to identify physically serious derivative structure, it is not clear how to implement this
strategy. (Maudlin 2007, 3161, emphasis added)
We have italicized the key phrase here. Suppose one managed to show that certain derivative
quantities in a non-spatiotemporal theory took on values corresponding to the values of spatiotem-
poral quantities; one would have an algorithm for generating predictions about phenomenal space
(especially material systems in space). According to the passage quoted, such a derivation (even if
the predictions were correct) would not show that spacetime had really been derived; in addition,
we have to be assured that the derived structure is ‘physically salient’.
If one, say, has a theory of small things in space, and one derives from their collective behavior
the behavior of large things, then there is a pretty clear sense in which the identified, collective,
structure is ‘physically salient’—the physics of the whole depends on the physics of its spatial parts.
13We can report happily that we are currently writing such a volume.
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But once we consider theories without spacetime, and perhaps lose the notion of spatial parts, this
analysis cannot be sustained. Perhaps some non-spatial analogue of part is needed, which builds
in ‘physical salience’ in some way? But what would make some other sense of parthood itself
physically salient? So the worry is that the demand of physical salience can never be satisfied by
a theory without fundamental spacetime; in which case a merely technical derivation of putative
‘local beables’ can never show that they can be identified with the local beables of experiment and
observation; that is, the conceptual gulf between spatiotemporal phenomena and the fundamental
theory is too wide to bridge—there is, after all, a general argument for empirical incoherence.
Without actually giving a specific account of ‘physical salience’ that could encompass all the
theories we’ve discussed (let alone all possible theories of the kind), some reflection on what work
such a concept is supposed to do in science will show that Maudlin’s challenge evaporates. Before
explaining why, we want to briefly raise, and quickly put aside, one kind of question: ‘why is it that
we have direct experiences of local beables, if there are none fundamentally?’ First, the conditional is
surely a red herring: many (perhaps all) of the things we experience are non-fundamental (herrings
and redness, for instance), so that alone can’t be a problem. The usual story that we tell in the
case of perceived non-fundamental entities has to do with the physical properties of events, causing
changes in the environment, which propagate and cause physical changes in us. As a result . . . by
the mind-body magic, we perceive the events. But if a theory without fundamental local beables
has any chance at being correct, everything on the physical side of the usual story will have to be
derivable—so the only issue remaining is how the mind-body connection is understood within the
theory. But this, of course, is a question that every theory must face, so it can hardly be posed
as a special challenge to those without spacetime. (Indeed, despite occasional suggestions to the
contrary, it’s unlikely that any details of fundamental physics will shed light on the question at all,
meaning that the mind-body story would have to get worked out at a higher level.)
That kind of concern aside, there are two ways of looking at the idea of physical salience: ‘from
below’, as Maudlin seems to, taking for granted that the theory has physical salience, and asking
what formal derivations of higher-level structures preserve it. But one can equally legitimately
consider the idea ‘from above’, taking for granted that the empirical realm has physical salience
(which it certainly does), and asking how it can ‘flow down’ formal derivations to give physical
significance to the underlying theory.
First, starting ‘from below’, suppose that we agree that some theory without fundamental
spacetime—say a NCFT, formulated algebraically—captures physical reality: it has physical salience.
And suppose that a technical derivation of local beables is found: as, for instance, in the derivation
of scattering events via the ?-multiplication representation. Our current conception of physical
salience will not imply that the derived structure inherits it from the fundamental theory, because
that conception is inherently spatiotemporal: the derived structure isn’t ‘composed’ of smaller
parts, it doesn’t result from some ‘mechanical process’ of more fundamental entities, it isn’t some
‘localized part’ of some more diffuse structure, and so on. But thus acknowledging that the derived
structure could never inherit ‘physical salience’ in the ways understood by our current theories,
serves to highlight the fact that the very concept is theory-dependent, and hence that the argu-
ment from below is essentially question begging.
Of course there are historical precedents. To return once more to the seventeenth century, the
Cartesians (sensibly) argued that only derivations involving changing configurations of geometric
pieces of matter, and collisions between them were allowable—preserved ‘physical salience’ we
might say. Any other higher-level structures would have to be put down to chance, and were
otherwise physically inexplicable. But they were wrong, something learned from finding theories
that better match the phenomena: Newtonian gravity allows action at a distance. (Of course that
was wrong too, and in (commutative) field theories we take some notion of locality to be essential;
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and so on.) These theories share the idea that physical salience involves spatiotemporal notions,
but that’s no surprise (and no argument either) because they all assume space and time! When
one considers theories with spacetime in the fundamental theory, one simply has to expect that
any notion of physical salience will have to shift accordingly. Whilst eschewing any conclusions
about irrationality, physical salience is thus exactly the kind of philosophical concept that Thomas
Kuhn (1962) identified as part of any theory, and which undermine any facile accounts of theory
comparison. In short, we say Maudlin’s challenge amounts to inappropriately holding theories
without spacetime to the standards of theories that postulate it.
To be fair, the end of the quotation does leave open the possibility of developing the idea
of physical salience to encompass non-spacetime theories. Clearly we do not believe that such a
question can be addressed a priori, but how might it be addressed within a theory? It seems to us
that it will be answered by considering what formal derivations actually produce structures that
are in agreement with elements of the empirical realm. If the supposed derivation from a theory
without spacetime produces quantitative agreement with the observed properties of local beables—
and hence derived mathematical counterparts of local beables and their observable properties—then
that is evidence both for the theory and the physical salience of the derivation. We will learn what
is physically salient in the theory by learning how, in general, to make successful predictions from
it. Looked at this way, Maudlin has the order of things reversed: we should not figure out what it
is to be physically salient and then use the concept to validate derivations. Instead, the empirical
success of the derivations is already our best guide to their salience. Thus there is no conceptual
challenge to empirical coherence ‘from below’.
This discussion has thus already led us to look at the issues ‘from above’. What we want to do
now is spell out more carefully how physical salience can flow down, in a way that poses no threat
to empirical coherence—and clarifies the philosophical project of understanding the emergence of
spacetime. David Lewis (1970, inspired by Carnap) proposed (broadly speaking) to understand the
meaning of theoretical terms in the following way. Suppose we have a new theory, which postulates
and describes a new entity τ—that’s what we mean by saying pτq is a ‘theoretical’ term. For the
theory to get some purchase on the physical world as we understand it, it will also have to carry
implications for things we are already familiar with; formally, this can be achieved if it contains
terms that are antecedently defined—let poq be such an ‘old’ term in the theory. To make things
semi-formal, suppose that the theory can be expressed as a sentence T (τ, o). Lewis then proposes
that when scientists talk about τ they mean the unique x such that T (x, o) (the open sentence
obtained by replacing every occurrence of τ with x). That is, the meaning of τ is defined in terms
of its logical place in the theory in relation to terms whose meaning we already understand (with
a few modifications to generalize to theories with more terms). Of course, the theory itself asserts
the existence of this entity.
There are undoubtedly problems with this story as a general view of meaning in science (it
makes meaning dependent on the exact truth of a well-defined theory) but equally it undoubtedly
captures something right about the way that scientists understand terms of which they only have a
grasp through theory—as often happens in the cutting edge of theoretical physics, in particular.14
Now, in the case at hand, the situation is a little different from that considered by Lewis, because
something derived will, by definition, not appear in the theory, and so the corresponding old term
will not appear in the theory sentence. Instead, suppose we have a theory, T (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn), of some
non-spatiotemporal entities, τ1, τ2, . . . , τn, and a demonstration that, given suitable idealizations,
14The problems mentioned are typical for description-based theories of reference, and are exploited by Kripke, for
instance, to argue for a theory of direct reference. In our view, scientists are opportunists about reference, variously
using description or some mode of direct reference, depending what is available and best suited to their current
purposes.
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some formal structure can be derived in which certain variables are functionally related just as
phenomenal—‘old’—spacetime quantities. (Actually, we suspect that this sort of situation is the
norm in physics, rather than the formally cleaner case considered by Lewis.) But the general scheme
still works: the τs are defined to be the unique collection of things satisfying the theory, such that
the structure in question veridically represents the spatiotemporal quantities. So, by definition, if
the τs exist, there is no further question of whether spacetime emerges from them, since they just
are (in part) the things from which spacetime emerges.
One is rightly suspicious of attempts to define away problems, and an aspect of Maudlin’s
concern still arises—but in a form in which it can be addressed. Now the question is whether there
are unique things answering the theoretical description of τ1, τ2, . . . , τn such that the identified
emergent structure is phenomenal spacetime. Put existentially this way, the problem is clearly one
of scientific realism: do we have adequate evidence for such entities or not? This is hardly the
place to enter a general debate, so the only question is whether there would be special reasons for
doubting the truth of the theory-sans-spacetime at stake, given empirical evidence. In the first
place, we do not think that the passage that we quoted clearly identifies any. Second, we believe
that any such special worries can only be sensibly investigated through a study of particular theories
purporting to describe emergent spacetime, not a priori, via the most general considerations. So
here we will simply note (as many have before) that the further one gets from the phenomena, the
more tenuous the chain of evidence becomes, and otherwise table the challenge.
So Maudlin’s challenge is defused. But the points that we have just made have a far broader
significance than we have so far seen. The program of interpreting a theory ‘from above’, of
explicating the empirical significance of a theory, is both ‘philosophical’ in the sense that it requires
the analysis of concepts, and crucial to every previous advance in fundamental physics. While we
don’t agree with every conclusion that he draws, such is a basic lesson of Michael Friedman (2001);
Robert DiSalle (2006) comprehensively illustrates the point in the history of spacetime physics.
Moreover, we agree with them that the historical record shows that such work is not a matter of
waiting until an uninterpreted formalism is developed (as the logical positivists assumed when trying
to make sense of this aspect of science). Rather it is work that is and must be carried out in parallel
with formal developments. As such, it must be pursued by the study of theory fragments, toy
models and false theories capturing some promising ideas, asking how empirical spacetime relates
to them—in effect, studying how spacetime emerges from theories without fundamental spacetime.
For that reason we believe that philosophers are well placed to assist in the development of the
next physics, so that the significance of studying theories of quantum gravity goes far beyond the
novel metaphysics that they hint at. We are very pleased that this essay is appearing in a volume
of work taking the first steps in this direction. We strongly encourage all philosophers of physics
to pay special attention.
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